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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case: 
This is an appeal from an order of legal fees. The Defendant argues that the appeal is 
improperly taken for the following reasons: 
1. The Plaintiff did not timely object to the reasonableness of Defendant's 
Affidavits of legal fees or from the Court's order. The Defendant's attorney filed his Affidavit 
of legal fees in accord with Section 4-505 Code of Judicial Administration, as ordered by the 
court on October 20, 1995 (R.707). The Defendant filed a first objection Pro Se to the Judge's 
Order on November 16, 1995. (R.730) (No objection was made to the reasonableness of legal 
fees in that objection). The Plaintiff is entitled to object the form of the order 4-504(2), but 
not to the actual order of the Court. An objection to the Order is made by appeal, or by 
Motion to Amend the Judgment under Rule 52(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure after the 
order is executed. The Plaintiff did neither. She simply objected to the court's Order, Pro Se 
while represented by counsel. 
2. Following Judge Stirba's Amended Order of November 17, 1995, (R.734) the 
parties on December 6, 1995, through their attorneys stipulated that the court should rule on 
the sole issue of whether the order of November 17, 1995 encompassed all work related to 
the contempt order since November 19, 1992 or just that work related to the October 20, 
1995 Order. The reasonableness of the attorney's fees was not an issue to be determined by 
the court. The stipulation does not appear in the record but is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
The stipulation was signed as evidenced by Mr. Clark's Affidavit, also attached hereto, 
Exhibit 1, (R821). In spite of the Stipulation, the Plaintiff filed a second Pro Se objection 
(R.730) to Judge Stirba's orders and this time objected to Defendant's attorney's fees. The 
objection was not timely filed under Rule 52(b) or Section 4-504, and is improper. Further the 
objection is to the content of the order and is improper as it is not an appeal, or a Rule 52(b) 
motion. Judge Stirba further objected to two memorandums (objections) being filed and 
refused to consider the second memorandum (objection) (R.972-974). Judge Stirba also 
considered the stipulation binding on the parties (R.954, 955). The objection to legal fees is 
improper on all basis. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts: 
1. On October 20, 1995 Defendant's contempt motion was heard by Judge Stirba. 
2. On November 6, 1995, the Defendant served and filed his affidavit for legal 
fees(R.711). 
2 
3. On November 14, 1995 Defendant's order on the contempt hearing was served 
on Plaintiff and filed with court (R.728). 
4. On November 16, 1995 Plaintiff filed a Pro Se objection to the court's order of 
contempt (The Plaintiff was represented by Clark Ward at the time) (R.730). 
5. On November 17, 1995 Judge Stirba issued a minute order relating to the 
Plaintiffs objections, and ordered a meeting between counsel and objections and a new order 
to be filed by December 8, 1995 (R.734). 
6. On December 5, 1995 Plaintiff filed a second Pro Se objection to Judge Stirba's 
orders and to the reasonableness of Defendant's attorney's fees (R.738). 
7. On December 6, 1995 counsel for the parties entered into a stipulation 
resolving all issues except attorney's fees. The only issue reserved to the court was whether 
the court was to consider all attorney services from November 1992 or just those rendered in 
regard to the October 20, 1995 hearing. See Exhibit 1 attached hereto. There was no issue of 
reasonableness of fees to be determined. 
8. On March 4, 1996 the contempt order was executed by Judge Stirba (R.762). 
9. A hearing on attorney's fees was held on November 22, 1996 before Judge 
Stirba and the order on legal fees was executed on January 6, 1997 (R.874). 
ARGUMENT 
Summary of Argument 
It is difficult to systematically state exactly what procedurally occurred because the 
Plaintiff while represented by counsel was filing her own documents and objections with the 
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court. Judge Stirba bent over backwards to accommodate the Plaintiff and the procedural 
morass she created (R.974). 
An action for contempt was filed in 1992 and was vigorously pursued between 1992 
and October 20, 1995 when the Plaintiff was placed in jail for wilful contempt of court. 
During the course of the proceedings there were: 
1. Five separate orders made by the court relating to correcting the Plaintiffs 
contempt; 
2. Seven (7) court hearings; 
3. Three (3) different responses required from Plaintiffs filings; 
4. 52 different filings required by Defendant to enforce the order. 
The Defendant also had to deal with three (3) different attorneys during the course of 
the action as Plaintiffs attorneys kept withdrawing from the action. 
The only facts that the Defendant believes are relevant to this appeal, center around 
the occurrences between October 20, 1995 and December 6, 1995. 
It is the Defendant's position that the parties through their attorneys stipulated that the 
only issue unresolved was whether the award for attorney's fees related back to 1992 or just 
to the October 20, 1995 hearing. The court ruled that the fees were awarded for all matters 
relating to the contempt since 1992 (R.874). No objection was made to that order or to the 
reasonableness of the attorney's fees. 
Second, that the Plaintiffs objection to legal fees was a second objection 
(memorandum) and was properly not considered by the court. Hence there was no objection 
to the reasonableness to attorney's fees. 
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Third, that the Plaintiffs objection to the court's order of November 16, 1995 is 
improper in all regards, but if considered as a Rule 52(b) motion it is untimely filed and 
properly denied by the trial court. 
Last that the attorney's fees award is reasonable and supported by affidavit and 
sufficient facts under Rule 4-505 to warrant the court's award of legal fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
Stipulation Overrides Plaintiffs Objections 
On November 16, 1995 the court signed the order finding contempt on October 20, 
1995 (R.728). 
On December 8, 1995 (R.738) the Plaintiff filed a second Pro Se objection this time 
again objecting to the court's orders and the attorney's fees affidavit filed on November 13, 
1995 (R.711). 
The attorneys entered into a stipulation on December 6, 1995, resolving all issues of 
the dispute except as previously noted. The original of this document was signed by both 
parties. See Exhibit 1 attached hereto. 
The stipulation of counsel came after the Pro Se objections and resolved all pending 
disputes except as to which hearings the order applied. The Plaintiff may not now go back 
and argue that the court improperly refused to consider the objections. The stipulation 
resolved such issues. 
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POINT 2 
The only objection the Plaintiff ever made to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees 
was made in the December 5, 1995 objection (the second Pro Se objection). Judge Stirba 
properly refused to consider the second objection. She ruled that the Plaintiff failed to obtain 
leave of court to file an additional objection and that she would not consider it properly 
offered. 
The Defendant draws attention to Hartford v St. of Utah. 888 P.2d 694 (Q. Appeal 
1994). There the court interpreted Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration to mean 
that each party may only submit one memorandum in support of any issue. The court held 
"Here, it is clear that the plural "memoranda91 which appears in the rule and 
on which Hartford relies, refers to all memoranda received by the court-from 
all parties that either oppose or support any motion—and does not mean that 
each party may submit more than one memorandum. We agree with the State's 
contention that the ten-page limit imposed by Rule 4-501 (l)(a) would be 
completely ineffective if a party could freely file supplemental memoranda. 
Subsection (a) and subsection (b) explicitly provide for only a single 
memorandum to be filed in support of or opposition to a particular motion. 
Indeed, the only additional memorandum allowed is the reply memorandum 
provided for by subsection (c), but that option is limited to the moving party. In 
the case at hand, Hartford is the non-moving party. 
Furthermore the court of Appeals accorded the trial court "broad discretion in 
determining how a case shall proceed in his or her courtroom", and Judge Stirba refused to 
accept the second memorandum in that no leave of court had been obtained. 
Here the Plaintiff submitted Pro Se two memorandums and Judge Stirba properly 
rejected considering the second memorandum. Accordingly, there was no objection filed by 
the Plaintiff to the reasonableness of attorney's fees and the Plaintiff cannot now raise that 
issue. 
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POINT 3 
Plaintiffs Pro Se Objections Improper 
The Plaintiff filed a first Pro Se objection to the court's order finding contempt. The 
objection is improper in all regards. A party may not object to the court's order. A party may 
object to the form of an order under Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration but 
not to the court's order itself. The proper procedure is to file a Rule 52(b) motion, after the 
order is executed, and seek to amend the order, or file a motion for a new trial or appeal the 
court's decision. The Plaintiff did none of the above. The Pro Se objection was improperly 
made. 
However, if the court elected to treat the objection as a Rule 52(b) motion, then the 
court properly rejected the motion when executing the order on March 4, 1996. 
The Defendant refers to Debrv v Fidelity. 828 P.2 520 (Ct. App. 1992) that permits 
the court to consider a post judgment motion as a Rule 52(b) motion regardless of how it is 
captioned. 
POINT 4 
Attorney's Fees reasonable 
Judge Stirba ordered that Defendant's attorney submit his attorney's fees by affidavit 
pursuant to Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration.. Such an affidavit was 
submitted on November 6, 1995. No objection was made to the reasonableness of the fees 
until December 5, 1995, which is thirty (30) days after service. That objection was untimely 
filed, and was properly not considered by Judge Stirba. 
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The court viewed the affidavit and approved the fees based thereon and entered 
judgment. The Defendant seeks to now overcome that award and argues that the court's 
findings do not support the award. The court found that the attorney's fees were reasonable as 
submitted by affidavit. 
Further the parties stipulated that the attorney's fee affidavit was reasonable and that 
the only unresolved issue was to which hearings and work the court awarded the fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant Appellee believes this appeal is improperly taken for the following 
reasons: 
1. No objection to the reasonableness of attorney's fees was made in the trial 
court; and 
2. The parties stipulated that the reasonableness of attorney's fees would not be 
contested; 
3- Further the Defendant's attorney's fees were submitted by affidavit under Rule 
4-505 without objection, and the Court found the fees reasonable. 
DATED this the 16~ day of June, 1997. 
NEMELKA & MANGRUM P.C. 
by. 
DENNIS ii/MAWGRUM 
Attorney fcM Defendant 
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CLARK R. WARD 
Attorney at law 
Utah Bar License No. 3378 
7050 Union Parka Center, Suite 420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
telephone: (801) 561-4400 
RlCQBIS7SS3TSe*JllT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 7 1996 
S/-iLT LAKE CGuivfiY 
UopULy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAT!- OF UTAH 
E1 11Z A ~ 7- T H JANE KRAME ^
 / 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
• •
 i n N E Y STEVEN KRAMER, 
Defendant. 
COUNTY -_r
 k-:T TTNVTT 
COMES NOW CIax 
Judge STIRBA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
at icrne-'. lerern *,: ; after 
as follows: 
^ •• , a t t o r n e y cinlv l i c e n s e d 1 practice -a- , a * »\ 
e n t i t l e d a c t i o n . 
2 That I s i g n e d my name t o a p p r o v e ''-v- i n t e n t - of a l e t t e r 
«-.-•. ) t - .• : i ; ; I: :i :i zl :> • • i f 
counsel for the uelenuant. My signiture was in-.-ue after Decembti 
1995 because I was out of the country between December 1st through 
' -i ' .ipproved this letter after f:~st fully consulting 
with the plaint"1 +Cf ur^' >-M~>+-a ; r*i r*.-t • . . r^ n^coTi* . >j after discussing 
the -..:., 
fytllBlT «* 
made by telephone conversations during November 1995 and were by 
mututal agreement and in compliance with the Court's prior order to 
meet, and in liew of actually meeting at Mr. Mangrum's office as 
the court ordered. 
4. I further aver that discussions I held with Mr. Mangrum 
did NOT involve payment of actual fees incurred in connection with 
his bringing various motions for contempt against the plaintiff, 
but were limited to the $2,200.00 figure he proffered and which was 
awarded the court on September 8, 1995. I have no recollection or 
file notes that would indicate that additional fees were ever 
discussed or to be included. 
5. During November, 1995 I became ill with the flu and could 
not work. During this time I informed the plaintiff that 
objections to the court's orders might need to be made on a timely 
basis. The plaintiff offered to assist me in filing her objections 
which were timely done. 
6. While I was out of the country between December 1 through 
December 9, 1995 plaintiff filed a second set of objections after 
being informed by court personell that it was timely and 
permissable. Since I was unavailable, the plaintiff had no other 
course to follow and acted on the reasonable assumption that had I 
been available, I would have filed the second set of objections, 
also in reliance that she was acting properly. 
IR* ' s p e d I" mi I 1 J s u I mi i I I HI I t' li i s i i ii i 11II II In i v P T t n i b t mi „ II 'li "Huh 
A t t o r n e y 
0.1/ 0 \^hM^ 
Notary Public 
SHAUNA C. WRIGHT 
310 South Main #1305 
Sait Lake City, Utah 84101 
My Commission Expires 
January 6,1996 
L . - ^ ^ t . — — mm.S^J^Ufeh
 —
 ^ J 
13ENNIS L. M A N G R U M 
A T T O R N E Y A T LAW 
7 1 1 0 S O U T H H I G H L A X D D R I V E 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y . U T A H 84121 
(801) 943-8107 (801) 943-8217 
December 6, 1995 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South #304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: KRAMER vs KRAMER 
Case No. 894901343 DA 
Dear Judge Stirba: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff and Defendant have met and 
resolved most of the issues of the order as submitted and the 
objection of Plaintiff. 
Counsel have agreed the order as proposed properly states 
the order given by the Court, except as to legal fees: 
The transcript shows you made the following orders: 
1. Ms. Kramer will need to pay all reasonable and 
necessarily incurred attorney's fees and costs that Mr. 
Kramer has incurred in connection with the show cause 
hearings to date. 
2. ...require Ms. Kramer to pay for any time incurred by 
Mr. Mangrum that is reasonably and necessarily incurred 
in selecting an alternative therapist because she did 
not properly do that before and now the Court... 
The Defendant has interpreted your order to include all 
services performed to have the order of November 19, 1992 
enforced. The Defendant has submitted an affidavit detailing the 
services rendered in enforcing the order. 
The Plaintiff has interpreted your order to include all 
services performed to enforce the order of October 20, 1995. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff and Defendant are willing to 
submit the issue of legal fees to the Court for decision and have 
the Court execute the judgment as submitted in all other 
respects. 
Sincere 
DENNIS L 
Attorney a 
H 0 n o r abte ^ n n e P i Page 2 
December 6, 1995 
APPROVED: 
Clark Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DLM/ds 
